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Summary 
 
The ‘Swedish model’ of active labour market programmes is investigated in relation to 
some crucial institutional features with two aims: examining how successful it has been 
in the context of the high unemployment atypically experienced by Sweden in the 1990s 
and trying to derive some general lessons as to which type of programme works best.  
The effectiveness of the programmes in improving the labour market prospects of un-
employed participants is assessed in terms of their impact on individual employment 
probability and collection of unemployment benefits over time.  
The evidence as to the overall effectiveness of the programmes is rather mixed, with 
individuals joining a programme subsequently enjoying higher employment rates but 
also a higher probability of drawing unemployment benefits over time than if they had 
searched longer in open unemployment. 
The renewed eligibility to unemployment compensation following participation in a 
programme appears to be a most critical driving force behind these results. In fact, when 
comparing the programme effects for individuals entitled to unemployment benefits to 
the programme effects for non-entitled individuals, the positive effect on participants’ 
employment prospects disappears, being instead replaced by a much higher probability 
of benefit collection. 
Still, the various programmes may have differential effects, making it interesting to 
quantify the relative performance of the six main types of Swedish programmes that 
were available to adult unemployed workers entitled to unemployment benefits in the 
1990s: labour market training, workplace introduction, work experience placement, re-
lief work, trainee replacement and employment subsidies. 
The best performer is by far employment subsidies, followed by trainee replacement. 
The main finding that those programmes most similar to regular employment rank un-
ambiguously highest has however to be appraised in the light of the macroeconomic lit-
erature, which has documented large and negative displacement and dead-weight effects 
exactly for these types of programme.   3
The low unemployment rates traditionally enjoyed by Sweden have often been related 
to the country’s extensive system of active labour market programmes (ALMPs)
1, 
which has thus often been viewed as a model for other countries.  
In the early 1990s, however, Sweden was hit by its most severe recession since the 
war: unemployment swiftly reached unprecedented levels, and as a policy response, so 
too did the offer of labour market programmes (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1. Swedish total unemployment, broken into open unemployment and pro-






















Sources: Open unemployment rate is from the Labour Force Survey (LFS). Programme rate is defined as 
the number of programme participants over the labour force; the former is from the National Labour 
Market Board (AMS) register, the latter from the LFS. 
 
At over 3 percent of GNP, labour market programmes represented a substantial out-
lay for the Swedish economy, prompting research to be increasingly carried out with the 
aim of evaluating how successful such large-scale measures have actually been.
2  
A second feature that makes the Swedish case particularly interesting is the wide ar-
ray of different programmes among which unemployed individuals can potentially 
choose. Although all aimed at improving job-seekers’ labour market opportunities, 
some types of programmes provide direct incentives to move back into employment 
(e.g. by facilitating individuals’ job search, providing wage subsides or fostering the 
acquisition of work contacts and references), whilst other measures try to make the 
working option more attractive by providing incentives to improve individual produc-
tivity and skills (e.g. via formal teaching or work experience). In such an institutional 
context, a natural question concerns the relative effectiveness of the various pro-
grammes, ideally with the aim of singling out the best performing ones. Such an exer-
cise could prove instructive for other countries as well, in particular those who have re-
                                                 
1 E.g. Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991). 
2 For an extensive survey of these Swedish studies, see Calmfors, Forslund and Hemström (2001).   4
cently been focusing on active labour market policy.
3 Although with the obvious care 
required by cross-country comparisons, general lessons as to which type of programme 
is more effective could be shared (cf. e.g. Martin and Grubb, 2001).
4 
Accordingly, this paper relates and discusses the analyses in Sianesi (2001 and 2002) 
with two specific aims: 
1.  to investigate whether the ‘Swedish model’ was in fact successful in the context of 
high unemployment atypically experienced by Sweden, by appraising findings relat-
ing to how effective the Swedish ALMPs as a whole have been in improving the la-
bour market opportunities of unemployed individuals over the last decade; 
2.  to identify which type of programme works best, by quantifying the relative effec-
tiveness of  different  types of Swedish programmes. 
 
The outcomes used to assess the performance of the programmes are individual em-
ployment prospects as well as unemployment benefit collection over time (five years). 
Before turning to the review of these sets of results in Section 3 and their appraisal 
and discussion in Section 4 it is important to highlight several features of the Swedish 
institutional background which cannot be overlooked when performing the evaluation 
or interpreting the results. Section 1 deals with these features, whilst Section 2 sets out 
the corresponding framework for analysis. 
                                                 
3 Examples include the UK, where the ‘New Deal for the Young Unemployed’, introduced in April 1998 
and sharing some of the features of the Swedish set-up, offers five types of programme; France, where a 
series of measures targeted at unemployed youth were introduced during the late ‘80s; or Switzerland, 
where an ambitious array of programmes was set up during the ‘90s. In fact, both at the OECD (OECD, 
1996) and European Union (European Commission, 1998) levels, labour market programmes are increas-
ingly viewed as important measures to reduce long-term unemployment.  
4 Microeconometric studies looking at the relative effects of Swedish programmes include among others 
Carling and Gustafson (1999) for self-employment subsidies versus subsidised jobs, Melkersson (1999a, 
b) and Frölich, Heshmati and Lechner (2000) for programmes targeted at the disabled, Larsson 
(2000) for youth programmes, Johansson and Martinson (2000) for two types of labour market training 
programmes and Carling and Richardson (2001) for the relative efficiency of eight of the Swedish pro-
grammes. Evaluations of differential programme impacts outside the Swedish context include the recent 
work by Gerfin and Lechner (2000) for Switzerland and by Brodaty, Crépon and Fougère (2000) as well 
as Bonnal, Fougère and Sérandon (1997) for France, and the earlier work by Ridder (1986) for the Neth-
erlands.   5
1. Swedish features  
1.1 Passive and active components of the Swedish labour mar-
ket policy 
The Swedish labour market policy has two components: a benefit system that supports 
individuals while unemployed and a series of active labour market programmes offered 
in order to improve the employment opportunities of unemployed workers.  
There are two forms of unemployment compensation
5, the primary one being the 
relatively generous (up to 80% of the previous wage) unemployment insurance (UI), 
while the roughly half as generous cash assistance (KAS) was mainly designed for new 
entrants into the labour market.
6 The duration of compensated unemployment is in prin-
ciple capped at 60 weeks for UI- and 30 for KAS-recipients. However, up to February 
2001, participation in a programme allowed job-seekers to renew eligibility to unem-
ployment compensation, making it in fact possible to indefinitely extend the period dur-
ing which unemployed individuals could receive benefits. 
A rather distinctive feature of the Swedish labour market policy which requires spe-
cial consideration when assessing programme effectiveness during the 1990s is thus the 
fact that a programme effectively came as a package of two competing components. On 
the one hand, it was expected to equip job-seekers with marketable skills which should 
facilitate their re-employability, but at the same time it could be used as a passport to 
renewed eligibility, thus reinforcing the work disincentive associated with the generous 
unemployment benefit system.
7 In order to display any positive effect, any skill-
enhancing component of the programme thus needed to be strong enough to outweigh 
the reinforced work disincentive associated with the entitlement renewability that par-
ticipation allowed. 
                                                 
5 Individuals not entitled to any form of unemployment benefits may receive means-tested social insur-
ance. 
6 As to eligibility, a certain degree of previous labour market attachment is required for UI; the ‘work 
condition’ of having worked for at least five months in the year preceding the current unemployment spell 
can however be replaced by an ‘education condition’ for KAS. 
7 Incentives to escape unemployment may have been weakened through, for example, higher reservation 
wages, lower search intensity or lower geographical mobility.   6
1.2 No programme participation in Sweden 
When the aim is to evaluate the effect of a programme on some outcome of interest, an 
essential part of the research question concerns the comparison state. One may for in-
stance be interested in the performance of one Swedish programme (e.g. labour market 
training) compared to another one (e.g. relief work). Still, interest often lies in assessing 
the effect of participating in a given programme (e.g. training) relative to no programme 
participation at all. The comparison group (or ‘control group’, to borrow a term from 
the experimental literature) should in this case be composed of the non-participants, that 
is those individuals not participating in any programme. 
The definition of the ‘no programme participation’ state in Sweden is however not as 
straightforward.
8 The object of the evaluation is a system of ongoing programmes, tak-
ing place continuously over time and open to all registered job-seekers. Unemployed 
individuals in turn can – and in fact often do – register repeatedly, and they can partici-
pate in various programmes at different times during their observed unemployment his-
tory. More important still is the fact that even when focusing on individuals who have 
just entered unemployment, it can in general be claimed that they will join a programme 
at some future point, provided they remain unemployed ‘long enough’; in fact, if unem-
ployed individuals in Sweden are not observed to go into any programme, it can be ar-
gued that it is because they have already found a job.  
Another related feature of the Swedish programme participation process is that once 
registered, unemployed job-seekers are most likely to take their decisions sequentially 
over time in unemployment. In particular, at any given moment the relevant choice open 
to them is not whether to participate now or not to participate at all, but whether to join 
a programme now or not to participate for now, in the knowledge that they can always 
join later on. For those who are in fact observed to find a job before going on any pro-
gramme, the participation-postponing decision has proven successful. The key choice 
faced by the unemployed in Sweden is thus a decision between participating in a pro-
gramme now or waiting longer in open unemployment in the hope of finding a job. Cor-
respondingly, what one can evaluate in the Swedish institutional set-up (in addition to 
the pair-wise comparisons of the various programmes) is the average effect of joining a 
given programme at a certain time compared to not joining any programme at least up 
                                                 
8 The discussion of an absent 'non-treatment' group was initiated by Carling and Larsson (2000a, b).   7
to then. Subsequently aggregating all the effects by time of entry would then recover the 
average effect, for those observed to join a programme, of joining when they did com-
pared to waiting longer than they have, where the average is taken with respect to the 
observed joining distribution of the participants. When interpreting the results it is thus 
important to keep in mind that the chosen comparison group does not reflect a no-
programme state, but rather a possibly postponed participation.
9 
A final clarification concerns the type of assistance effectively received by those in 
our chosen comparison group, i.e. by those (waiting longer) in open unemployment. In 
Sweden, the state to which programme participants can be compared to is in fact not one 
of being completely left on one’s own to look for a job, but rather the baseline services 
offered by the employment offices. Simply being registered as openly unemployed 
gives access to the various employment services offered by the offices, not only in 
terms of the increasingly computerised job information and matching of vacancies to 
applicants, but also in terms of the ‘job-seeker activities’, which include search-skill-
enhancing activities such as training courses on how to apply for a job and motivation-
raising activities. Note that in some countries this kind of assistance is in fact considered 
a programme in its own right.
10 
1.3 Richness of the data  
Analyses of Swedish labour market programmes can considerably benefit from particu-
larly rich data sources by international standards. In particular, the National Labour 
Market Board (AMS) records the programme and unemployment history (to the day) of 
all unemployed individuals registered at public employment offices. This register-based 
longitudinal event history dataset (Händel), available from 1991, provides each individ-
ual’s labour market status information over time (e.g. unemployed, on a given pro-
gramme, temporarily employed), together with important personal characteristics of the 
job-seeker and of the occupation sought. From 1994, the unemployment insurance funds 
provide additional information for individuals entitled to UI benefits or KAS (in 
particular, amount and type of compensation received, previous wages and working 
hours). 
                                                 
9 For more details on the implementation, see Sianesi (2001 and 2002).  
10 E.g. the Gateway period in the UK’s New Deal programme for unemployed people.   8
The end result is thus a very large, comprehensive and representative
11 dataset, 
which permits both short- and long-term evaluation of the programmes and with respect 
to a larger number of outcomes than is generally possible.
12 The analyses discussed in 
the following sections make use of extensive information on the labour market history 
of more than 110,000 individuals who first
13 became unemployed in 1994 and were 
then followed for five to six years until the end of November 1999.  
1.4. The ‘lost’ individuals  
Despite the richness and thoroughness of the administrative data just described, the un-
employment register does however suffer from an attrition problem. This occurs when a 
registered unemployed individual, having first missed an appointment at his official 
employment office, subsequently fails to contact the agency within a week, and is con-
sequently de-registered with the reason recorded as ‘contact ended’. 
Such ‘lost’ individuals are problematic, in the sense that the researcher is prevented 
from fully observing their true labour market status: which of these spells are in reality 
an employment spell the former unemployed individual failed to report to the agency, 
and which are by contrast still part of the preceding unemployment spell? Bring and 
Carling (2000), who traced a sample of ‘lost’ individuals, found that approximately half 
of them had in fact found a job. The problem is not just how severely under-reported 
employment status is in the data, but also the fact that such under-reporting may sys-
tematically differ between programme participants and comparison group members. It is 
thus important that results on programme effects on employment be checked in terms of 
their robustness to these lost spells. 
2. A framework for analysis 
The richness of the Swedish data may justify the use of methods of analysis based on 
‘selection on observables’, i.e. the key assumption that the evaluator can observe all of 
                                                 
11 Unemployment individuals entitled to compensation are required to be registered at a public employ-
ment office in order to collect their benefits, and only registered individuals have access to the pro-
grammes. In fact, over 90% of the unemployed do register at an employment office (from a validation 
study by Statistics Sweden, quoted in Carling, Edin, Harkman and Holmlund, 1996, Footnote 7), making 
the employment register-based dataset quite representative of the population of interest. 
12 Examples include unemployment – in particular of the benefit-compensated type –, employment, sub-
sequent programme participation, out of the labour force – including further regular studies. 
13 Strictly speaking, one cannot exclude the possibility that these individuals have had contact with the 
unemployment office before August 1991, the date when Händel starts.   9
the systematic differences (which are believed to affect labour market outcomes) be-
tween groups of individuals entering the different programmes or postponing their par-
ticipation decision. Before briefly discussing the plausibility of this assumption in rela-
tion to the available information as well as the selection process into the Swedish pro-
grammes, the following sub-section first sketches out the evaluation problem of interest 
and the method of analysis chosen. 
 
2.1 The evaluation problem  
Our evaluation problem consists of quantifying the average effect on programme par-
ticipants’ subsequent labour market performance from joining a programme when they 
did compared to waiting longer in open unemployment than they have. Additionally, we 
are interested in assessing the relative effectiveness of different types of programmes. 
More specifically, three evaluation questions will be addressed concerning 
(1) the effect of joining any programme compared to waiting longer, for individuals 
participating in any programme; 
(2) the effect of joining a specific programme P compared to waiting longer, for par-
ticipants in P; and 
(3) the effect of joining a specific programme P  compared to joining another pro-
gramme P’, for participants in P. 
To frame the problem in general terms, let us follow an established terminology in 
the evaluation literature and define a set of ‘treatments’ whose effectiveness is to be 
compared in the three evaluation questions:  
Question Treatment  A  Comparison treatment B 
(1)  Join any programme   Wait longer in open unemployment 
(2)  Wait longer in open unemployment 
(3) 
Join programme P 
Join programme P’ 
Notes: P and P’ are two different programmes, e.g. labour market training versus relief work. 
 
The aim is thus to evaluate the average effect for an individual of receiving treatment 
A compared to a hypothetical state in which he received treatment B. This amounts to 
addressing the question of how the post-treatment outcome of unemployed workers par-
ticipating in treatment A compares, on average, to how they would have fared had they 
taken comparison treatment B instead. The average outcome following treatment A for   10
individuals who have participated in A is observed in the data; by contrast, since no in-
dividual can be in two different states at the same time, assumptions need to be invoked 
to identify the counterfactual average outcome participants in A would have experienced 
had they taken treatment B instead.
14 
The simple comparison between the observed performance of individuals taking 
treatment A and individuals receiving treatment B is however likely to reflect the com-
position of the unemployed workers taking different treatments: groups of unemployed 
individuals with quite different characteristics are in fact observed to go into the various 
programmes or else to find a job before joining any, and their observed differences (e.g. 
qualifications, previous wage, pre-programme unemployment duration) are quite likely 
to affect the way they would have performed anyway, even had they chosen another 
treatment. 
One way to adjust for such differences in characteristics between groups A and B is 
offered by statistical matching, which pairs to each individual in group A an individual 
from group B with the ‘same’ observable characteristics.
15 Under the ‘selection on ob-
servables’ assumption that all the outcome-relevant differences between groups A and B 
are captured by observable characteristics, the average outcome experienced by the 
matched pool of B-participants can be used to proxy the counterfactual outcome partici-
pants in A would have experienced, on average, had they taken treatment B instead.
16 
2.2 Selection into the Swedish programmes   
As has already been highlighted, the method of matching just outlined requires the re-
searcher to observe all those differences between the various treatment groups that are 
                                                 
14 Identification assumptions and estimation of treatment effects in non-experimental studies have been 
extensively examined. Standard references in the evaluation literature include the comprehensive survey 
by Heckman, LaLonde and Smith (1998), as well as Heckman and Robb (1985), Heckman, Ichimura and 
Todd (1997, 1998), Heckman, Ichimura, Smith and Todd (1998), Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983, 1985) 
and Rubin (1974). 
15 Matching estimators can in practice be implemented by exploiting so called ‘balancing scores’, vari-
ables which provide a parsimonious way to adjust for differences in a (generally large) set of characteris-
tics. The determination of such variables for a single treatment versus no-treatment comparison is due to 
Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), whilst Imbens (2000) and Lechner (2001) (see also Brodaty, Crépon and 
Fougère, 2000) have generalised the approach to the case where a whole range of mutually exclusive 
treatments is available. For the technical details of the present implementation, see Sianesi (2001 and 
2002). 
16 Note that an additional condition is required, which in particular rules out the possibility of general 
equilibrium effects.   11
likely to affect their outcomes. It thus important to consider what observables are in fact 
available in relation to the selection process into the Swedish programmes. 
To this end, Figure 2 summarises the extensive discussions in Sianesi (2001 and 
2002) by highlighting the agents – the unemployed job-seeker, his caseworker and the 
local conditions prevailing at his employment office – whose interactions determine the 
outcome of the selection process (i.e. whether an individual joins a programme and if 
yes which one), as well as how these respective influences are captured in the available 
data. 
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Running out of benefits 
Age 
Gender 
Part-time unemployment  





Looking for part-time job 
Willing to move 
Able to take job at once 
In need of guidance 
Difficult to place 
Offered a programme 
County 
Month 
At the individual’s office and that time: 
Local programme rate (‘programme capacity’)
Local offer rate (‘waiting list’) 
Local programme mix 
Subjective overall evaluation of job-
seeker’s situation and character    12
The decision between waiting further in open unemployment or joining a (i.e. any) 
programme appears to be driven by the individual’s subjective likelihood of employ-
ment (Harkman, 2000, as reported in Carling and Richardson, 2001), which could in 
turn be proxied by several pieces of information characterising the recent employment 
history of the individuals; one can also control for factors relating both to employment 
prospects and either to potential returns from programme participation or to the oppor-
tunity cost or psychological cost of participation. Additional useful information allow-
ing us to capture caseworker selection relates to the officials’ own subjective and syn-
thetic overall evaluation of the situation and character of their unemployed client, sum-
marising individual traits that are potential indicators of unobserved heterogeneity. This 
latter type of information proves particularly valuable also when considering the deci-
sion to choose one specific programme among the available ones, since Harkman 
(2000) has found the relevant decision-maker to be the caseworker in this case.  
Finally, local indicators at the individual’s municipality / employment office level 
over time should control for the possibility that individual joining decisions and/or of-
fice-specific programme selection criteria may be based on local unobserved character-
istics which in turn may correlated with individuals’ labour market performance.
17 
3. Some empirical results for the 1990s 
Before moving on to the empirical findings, the main conclusions emerging from Sec-
tion 2 are that: benefit entitlement considerations should not be overlooked when 
assessing the past effectiveness of the Swedish programmes; both analyses and 
interpretation of the results need to take account of the non-standard definition of the 
‘comparison group’ in the Swedish context, and some robustness checks should try to 
take account of the ‘lost’ individuals. This last issue aside, the available data is very 
representative and includes a wide array of demographic and human capital variables, 
together with information on unemployment history and unemployment benefit receipt, 
as well as the caseworker’s appraisal of various factors relating to the overall situation 
and needs of service of the job-seeker. Such unusual richness of the data has motivated 
the matching approach from which the following results were obtained. 
                                                 
17 A possible source of violation of the ‘selection on observables’ assumption would be the presence of 
hidden job offers, that is if individuals waiting longer have decided to do so because they know they will 
be hired shortly.   13
3.1 The Swedish ALMP system as a whole 
It seems appropriate to begin by focusing on the overall performance of the Swedish 
system – a system comprising both a collection of programmes and a closely inter-
twined unemployment benefit component. Sianesi (2002) has examined the effective-
ness of the Swedish unemployment system in improving the opportunities of unem-
ployed individuals over the last decade, so that results reviewed here are based on all of 
the programmes combined into one, and relate to the question of how job-seekers who 
join a Swedish programme perform, on average, compared to a situation where they 
would have searched longer as openly unemployed. 
As to the employment prospects of programme participants, although joining a pro-
gramme has a negative effect in the very short term, the programmes’ impact on partici-
pants’ more long-run employment probability is positive and significant. As shown in 
Figures 3A, joining a programme is initially expected to reduce the chance of finding 
employment: compared to open unemployment, job search whilst on a programme is 
clearly reduced because less time is left due to participation itself (the ‘lock-in effect’).  
 
Figure 3. Average effect for participants of joining a programme (compared to waiting 
longer in open unemployment) on employment probability over time  
(A) 95% confidence intervals bands 
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Notes: Time in months, with t=0 at programme start.  
 
Nevertheless, after a programme typically ends, participants do appear to perform 
significantly better than if they had waited longer in open unemployment, with their 
participation decision paying off in terms of an average of 5 percentage points higher 
long-term employment probability (for at least up to five years). Various sensitivity 
analyses, bounds and imputation techniques have highlighted that this evidence is in 
fact likely to be quite robust to the problem of the ‘lost’ individuals. Figure 3B in par-
   14
ticular shows the worst- and best-case bounds for the programme effect on employment 
rates, which were derived exploiting the additional information from the Bring and Car-
ling (2000) survey. 
By contrast, the fact that programme participation entitles individuals to renewed un-
employment compensation is indeed found to create strong incentives to remain within 
the official unemployment system, in particular to be drawing unemployment benefits 
over time and on a ‘cycling’ basis. Figure 4A shows that as soon as the programme 
typically ends (i.e. after approximately 5-6 months), the negative effect on benefit col-
lection probability (by construction, compensation while on programmes is not counted 
as unemployment benefits) abruptly turns into a large positive one of almost a 15 per-
centage point higher probability.  
 
Figure 4. Average effect for participants of joining a programme compared to waiting 
longer in open unemployment on  
(A) benefit receipt probability over time 
 
t 
 treatm effect P(benefits)  95% 
95%  










(B) compensated cycle probability over time 
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  Notes:  Time in months, with t=0 at programme start.  
  95% confidence intervals bands. 
 
Over our horizon, participants remain significantly more likely to be drawing bene-
fits up to four years after having joined the programme than if they had waited longer in 
open unemployment. In fact, they are likely to be drawing benefits on an unemploy-
ment-programme cycling basis. This can clearly be seen when considering the effect of 
joining a programme (rather than waiting longer) on the probability of subsequently be-
ing alternating between compensated unemployment spells and (benefit-renewing) pro-
gramme spells. To this end, an individual who is openly unemployed or on a pro-
gramme is defined to be in the midst of a ‘compensated cycle’ if his present unemploy-  15
ment or programme spell is part of an uninterrupted chain of alternating unemployment-
programme spells, where in each of the unemployment spells the individual draws un-
employment compensation. As revealed by Figure 4B, there is quite a sizeable positive 
programme effect on compensated cycle probability, reaching 10 percentage points and 
persisting for well up to 50 months after entry into the programme. The fact that former 
programme participants keep going on various programmes without exiting 
unemployment, is clear evidence of a failure of the programme system itself, while the 
importance of compensated cycling behaviour points to a likely failure in the way in 
which incentives are taken into account by the intertwined unemployment benefit-
programme institutional system.  
Overall, the impact of the programme system is thus found to have been mixed, in 
line with both programme components being at work: the skill-enhancing component 
and the work disincentive element. Compared to longer job search in open unemploy-
ment, individuals joining a programme are found to be more likely to return to benefit-
compensated unemployment, to re-enter more programmes in the future, or to alternate 
between benefits and program participation over time. At the same time, however, join-
ing a programme also considerably reduces the probability of being unemployed outside 
the official (and compensated) unemployment system, and to a lesser extent of exiting 
the labour force. In fact, the net effect is that unemployed individuals who go on a pro-
gramme sooner (compared to later or never) have on average a higher probability of be-
ing in employment from six months after joining the programme for up to at least five 
years.  
Nevertheless, further results in Sianesi (2002) investigating the linkages between 
entitlement to unemployment compensation, programme participation and programme 
effects seem to indicate that the skill-enhancing component of the programmes may not 
always be strong enough to outweigh the work disincentives provided by the system. In 
particular, for individuals entering a programme around unemployment benefit exhaus-
tion – a time when entitled job-seekers are found to unmistakably enjoy (an over 10 
percentage points) preferential access to the programmes (cf. Figure 5) – the various 
programme effects are consistently found to be among the worst than for any other 
groups of participants. In addition to the disappointing results in terms of the probability 
of employment, de-registration from the unemployment office, regular studies and espe-  16
cially benefit receipt over time, by far the worst programme effect in terms of compen-




Figure 5.  Marginal effect of UI-status on the probability of joining a programme 
(percentage points difference in the programme joining probability with respect to non-
entitled individuals with the same characteristics of UI individuals), by months in un-













Various pieces of evidence thus consistently point to entitlement (renewability) con-
siderations as a weighty driving force behind the direction and strength of the observed 
programme effects.
19 When assessing the effectiveness of the Swedish programmes, it is 
therefore believed that a critical issue concerns the co-ordination and interaction be-
tween the programmes and the unemployment insurance system.  
The next sub-section presents some further analyses that single out those individuals 
whose incentives are most likely to be affected: job-seekers entitled to unemployment 
benefits. 
3.2 Programmes for unemployed adults: the role of entitlement 
status 
To shed more light on the linkages between entitlement to unemployment compensation 
and programme effects, this sub-section directly contrasts the programme effects for 
that sub-group of adults who were entitled to unemployment compensation when first 
                                                 
18 The average programme effect for this group is an average 8 percentage points higher probability of 
being in the midst of a compensated cycle over time, as opposed to 1.8 percentage points for individuals 
joining a programme in their first month of unemployment and 3.5 percentage points for the whole group 
of participants. 
19 Previous Swedish evidence on the importance of issues relating to unemployment benefits, work disin-
centive effects and cycling behaviour includes Ackum Agell, Björklund and Harkman (1995), Carling, 
Edin, Harkman and Holmlund (1996), Regnér (1997), Agell and Lundborg (1999), Carling, Holmlund 
and Vejsin (1999) and Hägglund (2000). 
benefits 
expire  17
registering as unemployed to the programme effects for unemployed adults who were 
not entitled to benefits at the start of their unemployment spell. 
Following the previous sub-section, focus of the evaluation is on the overall effec-
tiveness of the six main Swedish programmes available to adult individuals at the height 
of the economic recession in 1994: labour market training, workplace introduction 
(API), work experience placement (ALU), relief work, trainee replacement and em-
ployment subsidies.
20  
Figure 6A (B) plot the average effect on employment probability for an entitled (re-
spectively for a non-entitled) unemployed individual of joining one of the above pro-
grammes, rather than searching in open unemployment for at least a while longer. The 
two figures offer a striking contrast. Although joining a programme initially has a sig-
nificantly negative lock-in effect for both sub-samples, programmes appear to reduce 
their entitled participants’ job search intensity much more severely, with a substantial 
lock-in effect of almost 20 percentage points compared to 5 for the non-entitled sub-
sample. 
However even after the typical 4-5 months duration of a programme, entitled partici-
pants do not seem to enjoy higher employment rates than if they had postponed their 
participation decision further. In fact, the negative programme effect persists for up to 
three years after entry into the programme, after which former participants become just 
as likely to be in employment as if they had further searched in open unemployment. 
These results are in sharp contrast to those for the non-entitled sub-sample, for whom a 
significant and substantial positive effect of the programmes was already visible just 
after 6 months. 
Figure 6C plots the programme effect on the probability of compensated unemploy-
ment for the entitled sub-sample. The comparison with the effect for the non-entitled 
sub-sample (Figure 6D) is again very revealing, with twice as much of a positive effect 
on benefit receipt probability for entitled individuals (peaking to 30 percentage points) 
compared to non-entitled individuals (up to 15 percentage points). Finally, results for 
the entitled sub-group display a pronounced second ‘hump’ starting around the 24
th 
month (=5 months on the programme + 14 months of maximum benefit collection + 5 
months on another programme) and lasting for another 14 months – a feature likely to 
                                                 
20 Results for the non-entitled sub-group relate to five programmes, since ALU is reserved to entitled in-
dividuals only.   18
be linked to cycling incentives, whereby programmes are simply viewed and used as a 
gateway to renewed benefit eligibility. 
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a Training, API, ALU, relief, replacement and subsidies for entitled; all but ALU for non-entitled.  
  Time in months, with t=0 at programme start.  
  95% confidence intervals bands 
 
In conclusion, the results – both in terms of employment rates and of benefit collec-
tion probability over time – for the sub-sample of entitled adults just considered are 
considerably worse than those obtained for the sub-group of non-entitled adults. Con-
trasting these two sets of results would thus lend support to the conjecture that for indi-
viduals entitled to unemployment compensation, the eligibility renewability rules are 
likely to significantly distort the incentives for participation and thus wipe out potential 
productivity-enhancing effects of several types of programmes.   19
Still, even when focusing on entitled individuals, the six programmes considered 
may well have heterogeneous effects: while some of them may simply lock participants 
in rather useless or low-qualified tasks that will give them no subsequent edge on the 
labour market, some others may endow participants −  and even participants entitled to 
unemployment benefits −  with skills marketable enough to make the working option 
sufficiently attractive. The following sub-section thus moves a step further and disag-
gregates the composite ‘programme’ analysed above into its six distinct components. 
3.3 Differential programme performance  
In order to focus on that group whose incentives appear to be most affected and for 
whom the trade-off between skill-enhancing components of the programmes and the 
reinforced work disincentive associated with the benefit system should be at its sharp-
est, this sub-section more closely examines the sub-sample of entitled individuals con-
sidered above.
21 In particular, it reports and discusses selected results by Sianesi (2001) 
investigating both the separate and the relative performance of the six main Swedish 
programmes available to entitled adults in the mid 1990s and considered as a whole in 
the previous sub-section. 
Additional interest in this sub-sample arises from the fact that individuals entitled to 
unemployment benefits not only have exclusive access to ALU – a measure introduced 
in 1993 with the explicit aim of preventing entitled individuals from running out of 
benefits – but also enjoy ‘special’ conditions on programmes of wider access (in par-
ticular, they are in principle granted the right to relief work when approaching benefit 
exhaustion).  
Table 1 contrasts the main features of these programmes, which all aim at improving 
their participants’ re-employment prospects, though by providing them with distinct 
kinds of skills and in quite diverse ways.  
Labour market training is intended to teach participants new vocational skills deemed 
in demand in a formal (classroom) environment. By contrast, the two ‘work practice 
schemes’ – API and ALU – offer a workplace traineeship to gain practical on-the-job 
experience, good working habits and references which should later prove useful on the
                                                 
21 Almost 31,000 adult individuals who were entitled to either UI or to KAS when first registering as un-
employed in 1994 make up this sub-sample.  20
Table 1. Synoptic table of the main features of the programmes  
PROGRAMME  AIM  ELIGIBLE EMPLOYER  TRAINING  TASK  COMPENSATION




fill job openings quickly, job search 
assistance and training  
    job seeker activi-
ties  





equip individuals with skills to find jobs 
more easily 
>20  priv. and publ. 
providers 
full-time voca-




WORK PRACTICE             
Work experience 
placement (ALU) 
prevent exhaustion of benefits while 
maintaining contact with the regular 




90% public and 
non-profit 
 otherwise  not 
performed 
TA/BA free  labour  1,169
Workplace  
introduction (API) 
contact with working life to get work-
place training, job-experience and refer-
ences   
≥ 20  private and public  practical voca-
tional training  
otherwise not 
performed 




TEMPORARY JOB              
Relief  work  specially created temporary jobs to 
maintain working skills and habits, also 
to avoid benefit exhaustion 
 
 









grant 50% of labour cost up to 
fixed amount (SEK 7,000/month)
1,157
Trainee replacement  enhance skills of employee while pro-
viding an unemployed individual with 
work experience in a regular job 
≥ 20  80% in public 
sector 





grant 50% of labour cost up to 
fixed amount (SEK 
7,000/month); deduction of train-
ing costs; educational grant of up 












only; from 97 
some industries 
excluded 






grant 50% of labour cost up to 
fixed amount (SEK 7,000/month)
751
Notes: Information has been gathered from various sources, in particular, Swedish Institute (1997).  
a TA is training allowance equivalent to the UI or KAS the individual would have been entitled to; BA is the basic amount (SEK 103 per day) if the indi-
vidual is not entitled. 
 b Total monthly cost per participant (1998 USD); such information is from AMS (1998) and has been taken from Carling and 
Richardson (2001, Table 1), SEK converted to USD at the average 1998 exchange rate of 7.952SEK/USD.   21
regular labour market, while relief work involves specially created temporary jobs, 
mostly in the public sector. Participants in these latter three types of programme are 
however prevented – at least formally – from performing tasks that are part of the or-
ganiser’s normal activity. Although it is likely for such a rule to be often interpreted 
more as a recommendation
22, to the extent it is adhered to, the type of on-the-job prac-
tice acquired may not be expected to be particularly marketable.  
Similar to relief work, trainee replacement schemes offer an unemployed individual a 
temporary job by allowing him to replace a regularly employed worker on leave for 
education. Finally, employment subsidises not only represent a temporarily subsidised 
job opportunity to acquire job-specific skills, but in fact aim at initiating a permanent 
employment relationship, the engagement being implicitly expected to continue on a 
regular and indefinite basis after the programme. Like the two work practice schemes 
and relief work, trainee replacement and employment subsidies thus offer the opportu-
nity to gain skills and experience on the job; in these latter cases, though, the participant 
does in fact replace ordinary labour. Finally, while trainee replacement is intrinsically a 
temporary opportunity to invest in job-specific skills, employment subsidies almost en-
tail the ‘promise’ of a permanent job.  
Figures 7 looks at the separate effectiveness in terms of participants’ employment 
rates of each of the six programmes compared to a hypothetical situation where partici-
pants would have searched longer in open unemployment. Joining any of the pro-
grammes is again confirmed to have a negative lock-in effect on participants’ short-term 
employment probability, reducing their chances of being in employment by an over 15 
percentage points probability in each case. The impact of joining a programme on more 
medium- and long-term employment prospects is however found to radically vary ac-
cording to which programme the individual has joined.  
In particular, participants in trainee replacement and in API are just as well off as if 
they had been searching further as openly unemployed, while the decision to enter a job 
subsidy programme significantly pays off in terms of persistently higher employment 
rates (up to 40 percentage points) soon after the programme typically ends. By contrast, 
for our sample of entitled unemployed adults it seems more worthwhile to intensively 
search longer in open unemployment rather than joining labour market training, ALU or 
                                                 
22 From e.g. circumstantial evidence in Hallström (1994; reported in Ackum Agell, 1995).   22
relief work. In fact, participants in these programmes subsequently enjoy lower em-
ployment rates than if they had postponed their joining decision further, with these 
negative effects persisting over a long time horizon before turning insignificant. 
 
Figure 7. Unemployed adults entitled to unemployment benefits: Average effect on 
employment probability over time of joining the specified programme compared to 
waiting longer in open unemployment for participants in the specified programme  
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Notes:   Time in months, with t=0 at programme start.  
95% confidence intervals bands. 
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The use of these latter types of programmes simply as a way to re-qualify for unem-
ployment benefits is likely to be at the root of these disappointing results. In fact, 
Sianesi (2001) finds employment subsidies to be the only programme to display a nega-
tive effect on compensated unemployment probability compared to postponing the par-
ticipation decision, while the trainee replacement programme has a zero effect. By con-
trast, participants in labour market training, relief work and either of the two work prac-
tice schemes ALU and API are all considerably more likely to be drawing benefits over 
time than if they had waited longer in open unemployment. Furthermore, for partici-
pants in these latter programmes there is clear evidence of unemployment-programme 
‘cycling’ effects. It is also quite revealing to compare the potentially different effective-
ness of the two work practice measures, ALU and API. As previously mentioned, whilst 
sharing the basic features of API, ALU is exclusively reserved to entitled individuals 
and has been explicitly instituted to prevent them from exhausting their benefits. It is 
thus not too surprising that compared to waiting longer in open unemployment, the per-
formance of ALU is slightly worse than that of API in terms of employment probability 
over time and that ALU participants display an even stronger propensity to be drawing 
benefits on a visibly ‘cycling’ basis compared to waiting longer than do API partici-
pants had they waited longer too. The explicit, close link between entitlement renew-
ability and programme (as institutionalised in the case of ALU) would thus seem to se-
verely impact on the programme’s effectiveness on the labour market performance of its 
participants. 
Finally, Sianesi (2001) evaluates the relative performance of the six programmes, in-
vestigating how participants in programme A would have fared had they joined pro-
gramme B instead.
23 The main conclusion is that in terms of both employment rates and 
benefit collection probability, the best performer is undisputedly employment subsidies, 
followed by trainee replacement.  
Table 2 summarises the results from the various pair-wise comparisons in terms of 
employment rates. More specifically, individuals having joined the subsidy programme 
consistently enjoy a much higher (20 to 50 percentage points) employment probability 
over time than if they had joined an alternative programme. In addition, participants in 
any of these other programmes (with the possible exception of trainee replacement 
                                                 
23 Note that all these results are quite robust to the problem of the ‘lost’ individuals; the worst- and best-
case bounds for all the combinations of treatments have been derived in Sianesi (2001).   24
schemes) would have fared considerably better had they gone on job subsidies instead. 
The second best performing programme is trainee replacement: former deputies have 
considerably better employment prospects than if they had joined any other of the re-
maining programmes (in particular, training or work practice). Conversely, trainees and 
work practice participants would have improved their labour market performance had 
they joined a replacement scheme. As to the remaining programmes – labour market 
training, work practice and relief work – they do not seem to perform in a significantly 
different way between one another in terms of employment probability over time.  
 
Table 2 Informal summary of the pair-wise conditional average programme effects on 
employment probability over the 5-year horizon since programme start  
Comparison 
↓  
Training  Work  
practice 
a 
Relief Replacement  Subsidies 







0   mostly  0 
 
positive large  positive
Relief 0 0   mostly  0 
positive up to 15m 
large positive
Replacement negative  then 
zero from 30m 
negative  0 
(neg. but insig-
nificant at 95%) 
 large  positive
Subsidies  large negative  large negative large negative mostly negative   
Notes: This summary takes informal account of the statistical significance of the estimated effects; for the 
complete set of results, see Sianesi (2001). 
a API and ALU combined.  m = month(s). 
 
4. Summary and discussion 
The first research question set out in the introduction concerned the effectiveness of the 
Swedish unemployment-programme system in improving individual labour market op-
portunities during the recession of the 1990s. The evidence considered in the paper has 
been rather mixed; individuals joining a programme are found to subsequently enjoy 
higher employment rates but also to be more likely to draw unemployment benefits over 
time than if they had searched longer in open unemployment.
24 
                                                 
24 It may be worthwhile to stress again that these programme effects do not relate to the effect of joining a 
programme compared to never joining any, but rather compared to delaying participation at least some 
more time further while searching for a job in open unemployment.   25
Comparing the main lessons arising from studies performed at different times (in 
particular the switch from positive effects of Swedish labour market training in the 
1980s to negative ones in the 1990s
25), it may thus seem that the collection of measures 
that appeared to be quite effective in a low-unemployment environment may no longer 
be so successful if applied – and on a massive scale – in periods of severe economic 
downturns. On the other hand, it may also be argued that it is exactly in such difficult 
times of high unemployment when effective labour market programmes are be most 
needed to place participants back into work. Similarly, the large scale at which pro-
grammes have been administered may have prevented the efficient management and 
tailoring of the various measures. 
Nevertheless, possibly the most critical factor appears to have been the link between 
the programme system and the unemployment benefit system, an interaction quite likely 
to intensify in periods of high unemployment and unstable labour market conditions. 
Various pieces of evidence concerning this link have been combined and discussed. In 
particular, the evidence for individuals entitled to unemployment benefits provided a 
sharp contrast to the findings relating to non-entitled individuals, quite unmistakably 
pointing to distorted incentives behind programme participation as a most likely force 
behind the disappointing programme effects.  
All of these considerations thus raise the important issues as to whether there may be 
more efficient means of providing (sustained) unemployment compensation, as well as 
whether some programme expenditure could be more effectively redirected, for instance 
towards market-based incentives to stimulate labour demand (e.g. by decreasing payroll 
taxes). 
The second question motivating the paper concerned the possibility of scrutinizing 
the Swedish experience in order to derive some general lessons as to which type of pro-
gramme works best. The answer that has emerged is that those programmes most simi-
lar to regular employment rank unambiguously highest, an overall conclusion not only 
in line with other Swedish analyses, but also with studies looking at different countries 
with varying labour market structures and policies.
26  
                                                 
25 For more details, see Calmfors, Forslund and Hemström (2001). 
26 For Sweden, cf. in particular the programme ranking obtained by Carling and Richardson (2001). For a 
summary of other Swedish evidence in line with the present results, see the review by Calmfors, Forslund 
and Hemström (2001). For OECD countries see the review by Martin and Grubb (2001) and e.g. Gerfin   26
In particular, while on employment subsidies or trainee replacement the participant 
performs a task that is by construction a useful one, one for which the firm is willing to 
pay a regular employee. These programmes should thus teach demonstrably market-
relevant skills, in contrast to e.g. labour market training with its emphasis on the class-
room-based acquisition of new skills which are deemed to be – or soon to become – in 
demand. A second advantage of these programmes is that they can be used as a cheap 
screening device of the participant’s initially unknown productivity in a regular task. 
For employment subsidies – with their informal promise of a job – there is thus a valu-
able opportunity for mutually trying out the likely future employment relationship on a 
low-cost basis. For trainee replacement, a signal is sent out to potential employers that 
the individual has been gaining (or at least maintaining) relevant skills. Participants in 
either type of programme are thus likely to become more attractive to potential employ-
ers, who value the fact that a job is being performed in the regular competitive market. 
By contrast, it appears that the formal vocational skills taught by labour market train-
ing, as well as the working skills, additional work experience, improved working habits, 
fresh contacts and references that relief work and the two work practice schemes are 
intended to provide may not be relevant – and thus valuable – enough to fetch a return 
on the labour market, or at least not one high enough to make the working option more 
attractive, this being particularly the case for individuals entitled to unemployment 
benefits. These types of programme are then likely to be regarded just as a gateway to 
renewed benefit eligibility, ending up locking their participants – in particular their enti-
tled participants – in the unemployment system. 
In the light of these results, it is actually worth pointing out how the ranking of the 
programmes in terms of their effectiveness is almost perfectly reversed when viewed in 
terms of their expensiveness (1. training, 2. ALU, 3. relief work, 4. trainee replacement, 
5. API and 6. subsidies – cf. Table 1, last column). 
It is however important not to jump to hasty conclusions as to which programmes 
should attract most public funds. As to job subsidies, apart from an increasingly re-
stricted legal possibility of extension
27, both survey and econometric Swedish studies 
                                                                                                                                               
and Lechner (2000) for Switzerland, Brodaty, Crépon and Fougère (2000) and Bonnal, Fougère and 
Sérandon (1997) for France, and Ridder (1986) for the Netherlands. 
27 The public sector cannot use such grants, and following EU regulations in 1997 neither do employers in 
the synthetic fibre, automotive, steel, shipyard, fishery and transport industries.   27
have found sizeable direct displacement effects (of around 65-70 percent).
28 Similarly, 
broadening such a measure is bound to lead to substantial dead-weight effects (i.e. sub-
sidising firm hirings that would have taken place anyway). For trainee replacement too, 
dead-weight losses have been both suspected in terms of the sponsored training
29, as 
well as documented in terms of the deputies, with a large share of participants found to 
be alternating between regular short-term jobs and trainee replacement with the same 
employer (see Harkman, Johansson and Okeke, 1999). Similarly, survey studies have 
uncovered displacement effects of the same order as employment subsidies (e.g. AMS, 
1998).
30   
In conclusion, although this paper has presented and discussed results which, per-
fectly in line with previous micro evidence, have found that a programme’s benefits to 
its participants are highest the more it resembles regular employment, several macro-
economic studies have documented large and negative displacement and dead-weight 
effects exactly for this type of programme. As discussed by Calmfors, Forslund and 
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